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For a single tariff, the "height" of the tariff is an  have developed a solution: the Trade Restrictive-
unambiguous measure of the policy's  restrictive-  ness Index, which they define as the uniform
ness. With more than one tariff, theory has not  tariff factor that is equivalent in trade rstrictive-
provided an extension that captures the idea of  ness (equivalent in the balance of trade) to the
the tariff's height, so analysts have used index  actual differentiated tariff structure.
numbers such as the mean and the coefficient of
variation (standard deviadon divided by the  Here, Anderson develops the Trade Restric-
mean) of tariffs.  tiveness Index in terns  of mean and variance-
covariance indexes of the tariff schedule. There
By contrast, the theoretical literature on the  are two payoffs. First, the Trade Restrictiveness
"piecemeal reform" of tariffs shows that ef.i-  Index can be decomposed into expressions that
ciency gains from tariff reforn  depend on  rescue the commonsense idea that lower mean
complex conditions that have little relation to the  and lower variance of tariffs are both efficient.
mean or variance of tariffs. But in the absence of  Second, a special case is offered in which the
a connection between theory and empirical  proper weights in the mean and variance of
measures, it is difficult to know whether to  tariffs are the observed trade weights.
discard tLhe  measures. Moreover, the piecemeal
reform question of measuring the welfare gain  Thus, the Trade Restrictiveness Index  is
from a tariff reform is not directly related to the  superior to traditional summary measures such as
problem of evaluating the height of restrictive-  the average tariff rate and the coefficient varia-
ness.  ton  for the tariff schedule. It requires only
limited additional information on the structure of
The problem of finding a single number  the economy to yield a measure that is preferable
analogous to the "height" of tariffs is the tariff  on both theoretical and practical grounds.
index iiumber  problem. Anderson and Neary
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Tariff index numbers  are widely  used for policy  evaluation,  despite the
deficiencies  which  stem from their lack  of theoretical  roots. The restrictiveness  of tariff
structures  is routinely  compared  over space  and time with import-weighted  mean tariffs.
Another  practically  important  tariff index is the import-weighted  coefficient  of variation
of tariffs (the square  root of the variance  divided by the mean). The World Bank
operations  staff use the coefficient  of variation  along with the mean tariff to measure
progress  in trade liberalization  as a condition  for structural  adjustment  loans.
For a single tariff, the height  of the tariff is an unambiguous  measure  of the
restrictiveness  of policy. With more than  one tariff, theory has not provided an extension
capturing  the idea of the 'height'  of the tariff, hence analysts  have used the mean and
coefficient  of variation. For uniform  tariffs,  a higher mean tariff is trivially  more
restrictive,  which  is the intuitive  sense behind  the import  weighted  mean tariff index. But
with a differentiated  tariff structure,  high tariffs  will get low weight  and low tariffs will
get high weight,  due to the substitution  effect. This seems  to be wrong. Concerning  the
variance,  on the one hand, the reasoning  behind  the World Bank's promotion  of lower
dispersion  is that uniform ad valorem  tariffs do not distort relative  prices among  tariff-
ridden goods. This appears  to suggest that  if two tariff schedules  have  equal import-
weighted  mean tariffs,  hence in some  sense equal distortion  relative  to other goods, the
schedule  having  less variance  is more  efficient. On the other hand, the theoretical
literature  on piecemeal  reform  of tariffs (Fukushima  (1979),  Hatta (1977),  and Bertrand-
Vanek  (1971)) has very stringent  sufficient  conditions  for efficient  reform  which warn
that this is a dangerous  procedure. Because  the condidons  are over-sufficient, and not
lSee  for  example  any  undergraduate  text  in intemadonal  economics.Tariff Index  Theory  J.E. Anderson  2
directly  related  to tariff moments,  they provide  little practical  guidance. That is :he
subject  of this paper.
The problem of finding  a single number  analogous  to the 'height' of tariffs is the
tariff index number  problem. Anderson  and Neary  (1991)  develop  a solution,  the trade
restrictiveness  index. It is defined  to be the unifonn tariff factor which  is equivalert in
trade restrictiveness  (equivalent  in the balance  of trade) to the actual differentiated  tariff
structure. In rates of change  it is equal to the familiar  marginal  dead-weight loss of
changes  in tariffs normalized  by the 'shadow  value of distorted  trade'. The normalization
is based  on the distance  function formalization  of index number  theory. In contrast,  the
standard  assessment  of the welfare  effect of tariff changes  uses  other normalizations,  such
as national  income. For the purpose  of comparing  changes in the restrictiveness  of trade
policy  internationally,  normalizing  by national  income has the fatal defect that 'naural'
openness  and economy  size interact with the 'height'  of the tariff. 2
This paper develops  the trade  restrictiveness  index in terms  of mean and variance-
covariance  indices  of the tariff schedule. There are two payoffs. First, the trade
restrictiveness  index can be decomposed  into expressions  which  rescue the common
sense idea that lower  mean and lower variance  of tariffs are both efficient. Second,  a
special  case is offered  in which the proper weights  in the mean and variance  of tariffs are
the observed  trade weights.
Section  I reviews  the theory of the trade restrictiveness  index developed  in more
detail in Anderson  and Neary  (1991). Its interpretation  and relation  to the standard
measure of efficiency  are set out. Section  II develops  rate of change of the trade
2Consider  the  uniform  tariff  case,  where  the  height  of the  tariff  is unambiguous.  The  welfare  measure
normalized  by national  income  is the  Harberger  tiangle  divided  by  national  income,  which  works  out to
r2eq  1for  the  move  to free  trade,  where  T  is the  height  of the  ad valorem  tariff  (on  the  domestic  price
base),  pZ/I  is the  ratio  of the  value  of tariff-ridden  imports  to national  income,  and  e is the  elasticity  of
composite  import  demand.  Natural  openness  and  economy  size  affect  both  pZ/I  and e , hence  make  this
index  useless  for the  purpose  of comparing  the  height  of the  tariff  across  nations  . For  intertemporal
comparisons  over  short  time  periods,  normalizing  by income  is less  objectionable.Tariff Index Theory  J.E. Anderson  3
restrictiveness  index in terms  of changes  in the mean and 'generalized  variance-
covariance'  functions  of the tariff schedule. Efficiency  is indeed  decreasing  in both of
these 'moments'. The coefficient  of variation  index used by the World Bank varies
monotonically  with the trade restricdveness  index when: (i) the only form of distortion  is
tariffs, (ii) the two indices  are used to compare  a given tariff schedule  with the uniform
mean-equivalent  tariff schedule,  (iii) the import-weights  in the index are "marginal"
import  weights,  and (iv) the variance  concept  used in the coefficient  oi variation  is a
'generalized  variance'.
Section  III shows  that when the trade  preferences  for imported final goods are
CES, the ordinary variance  concept  may be used in place  of the generalized  variance, and
marginal  trade weights  may be replaced with the ordinary trade weights. Thus mean
preserving  eliminations  of trade weighted  variance  in tariffs are efficiency-increasing.
The rate of change  of the trade restrictiveness  index in the Cobb-Douglas case is
generally  a function  of the trade weighted  first and second  moments  of the tariff schedule,
although  it is not the coefficient  of variation  function.  This form of the trade
restrctiveness index highlights  an intuitiv  sense in which the trade weighted  mean and
variance  of tariffs were both 'partially'  legitimate.  Finally,  a Cobb-Douglas  example  is
offered in which variance  reductions  are efficiency  improving  subject  to the constraint
that the trade-weighted  mean tariff be the same. That is, comparisons  can be made in
which  variance  need not be eliminated. However,  even in the Cobb-Douglas  model,
when the mean and variance  both change  there are always welfare-improving  tariff
reforms  which  coincide  with a rise in the import  weighted  coefficient  of variation.
Sectior IV concludes  with some suggestions  for future practice.  Future work
(underway  at the World Bank  as part of the project  on trade policy evaluation)  will reveal
whether  the refinement  of the trade restrictiveness  index yields different  results in
practice. However,  in related  work Anderson  and Bannister  (1992)  show  that the tradeTariff Index  Theory  J.E. Anderson  4
restrictiveness  index for Mexican  agrici1'jre  yields results very different  from the
standard  producer subsidy  and consumer  subsidy  equivalent  indices.Tariff Index Theory  J.E. Anderson  5
1. Index Numbers  for Ta.iffs
Changes  in index numbers  are generally  weighted  averages  of changes in the
components  of the index. To be consistent  with economic  theory,  the weights  must arise
ftom a fundamental  economic  structure. It is helpful  to begin with reviewing  the
consumer  price index, or CPI where  the weights  are familiar. Subsection  1.  1 derives  the
consumer  price index based on the consumer's  expenditure  function and relates it to the
average  tariff. In Subsection  1.2,  the trade restrictiveness  index, or TRI, is derived  based
on the econ3my's  trade balance  function. The latter is defined  in Anderson  and Neary.
Here, the weights  are less  familiar,  but the same logic girds the construction  of the index.
Subsection  1.3  relates this welfare-consistent  index to the trade-weighted mean and
variance  of the tariff structure.
1.1  The Consumer Price Index and the Average Tariff
The basis for the CPI is the consumer's  expenditure  function,  e(q,u), where  q is the
vector  of prices and u is the reference level of utility. e is the minimum  level of income
required  to achieve  u when the consumer  faces q. The derivative  of e with respect to q is
equal to the vector  of the consumees  demands,  X, owing  to the minimum  value property
of e(.).
The vector  of consumer  prices changes  by dq. The consumer  price index (CPI)  in
rates of change  measures  the (hypothetical)  uniform  rate of change  in all prices which
produces  an equivalent  change  in the expenditure  required  to maintain  welfare. The
effect  of an arbitrary  set of price changes  on the level of income  required to support  u is
X'dq.  The effect of a uniform proportional set of changes is X'qcda,  where a  is the
(scalar)  proportionality  factor (q = aqO,  where  q° is the initial level of prices). Solving
for the uniform  proportional  change  in q which  creates the same  rise in required
expenditure  as the arbitrary  change  in q implies dca  = Xdq/X'q, or
(1.1)  da  =  £X3q)qi.Tariff Index Theory  J.E. Anderson  6
Initially  a is equal to one, so dt  is a percentage  change. This familiar  expression  weights
the proportionate  change  (denoted  by a A) in each qi by the consumption  share  of good .
One final step is required to link the development  of the CPI fimly to the trade
restrictiveness  index  developed  below. Suppose  that the means  of compensation  is
through  (hypothetical)  price reductions  rather than  through  (hypothetical)  income
transfers. The compensating  change  in expenditure  is replaced by a (hypothetical)
uniform  proportionate  change in prices which  compensates  for (i.e.,  offsets) the actual
change in prices dq. This procedure  defines a version  of (1.1) which  has opposite  sign:
(1 1')  da'  =  X(tX)qi)
The opposite  sign denotes  the direction  of the compensatory  change  in hypothetical
prices. This latter form is the one used in the trade restrictiveness  index.
The import-weighted  average  tariff index is based  on the false analogy of the
small trading  country  with the price taking  consumer  model which  is the basis of (1.1),
with X being the import  quantity. A set of tariffs raises  expenditure  of the consumer
relative to free trade, and the index computes  the uniform  tariff which  raises expenditure
by an equivalent  amount. Thus the proportionate  change  in qj is set equal to the ad
valoreM  tariff  rate and the value of trade in each category  is used as the weight:
(1.2)  = 
The mean tariff defined in (1.2) appears  to have the index number  problem that the'
current  level of imports  reflects the tariff-ridden  level of prices. An appropriate
adjustment  might seem to involve using the struc=e of substitution  effects to obtain  the
'right' weights.
It is well-known,  however,  that the economic  structure  of a tariff-ridden  small
trading  economy  is not equivalent  to that of the price-taking  consumer. The external
budget  constraint  links consumer  expenditure  requirements  to the level of production
income  and the government  revenue.  A change in the tariff vector  causes a change  in theTariff Index Theory  J.E. Anderson  7
expenditure  required to support u equal to X'dq. It also causes a change in government
tariff revenue equal to Xdq + (q-p*)'dX,  where  p* is the extemal price vector. Assuming
redistribudon,  the net effect  is equal to (q-p*)'dX,  the marginal  dead weight  loss.  This
suggest  that the weights  in a properly  based  tariff index must somehow  be linked to
marginal  dead weight  loss. The trade  restrictiveness  index  formaliz&.  this insight.
1.2  The Trade Restrictiveness Index
Depending  on the analyst's  objective,  there am a number  of possible  ways to
define an index of tariffs. Govempent bureaus  and international  agencies  which use
tariff indices for comparison  are interested  in potential  welfare,  so welfare-equivalent
indices are useful. Mercantilists  are interested  in the trade balance, so trade-balance
equivalent  indices  are useful. The trade restrictiveness  index is the  gwifon  tariff which
is equivalent  in its (utility-constant)  trade balance  impact  to the differentiated  tariff
structure. Thus the trade restrictiveness  index is both equivalent  in welfare  and in the
trade balance.
The first step of this section  is to develop  a counterpart  to the expenditure
function in the general equilibrium  context of a small tariff-ridden  trading  economy.
Based on it, the trade restrictiveness  index may be defined.
The Balance  of Payments  Function
The balance  of payments  fuwdon gives  the net foreign  exchange  required to
maintain  the utility  of a representative  consumer  facing given levels of tariffs. The
balance  of payments  funcdon is built up from the consumer's  expenditure  function and
the gross  domestic  product  funcdon.
The gross  domestic  product  function  g(p,v)  is the maximum  national  vs-hie  added
(output  less imported  inputs) when the economy  faces a vector  p of prices of final output
or imported  inputs and a vector  v of primary  factor supplies. The vectors  p and v are
assumed  to be fixed, the former by the small  country  assumption  combined  with a tax
policy; the latter by institutional  constraints  on employment. The derivative  of g with
respect to p, gp (in what follows,  a subscript  denotes  differentiation  save for the index  i orTariff Index Theory  J.E. Anderson  8
j), is equal to the output supply  or input  demand vector,  due to the maximum  value
property.
The trade balance  is equal under  the balance  of payments  constraint  to the net
ex ernal borrowing  of the economy. This means that the value of tradoe  in terms of
external prices  q* and p* is equal to the value of expenditure  evaluated  at prices  q, less
national  product  evaluated  at prices  p,  less (q-q*)'eq  plus (p-p*)'gp:
q*'eq  - p*'gp  =  qeq  - p'gp  - (q-q*)'eq + (p-p*)'gp.
Government  revenue  is equal to the final  consumption  tax revenue (q-q*)eq  plus the net
revenue from taxation  of final output or imported  inputs, - (p-p*)'gp. In balance  of
payments  equilibrium,  the trade balance  is equal to the amount of external borrowing,  I8.
The balance  of payments  function  is equal to
(1.3)  B(qp,u;q*,p*,v,)  =  e(q,u) - g(p,v) -,
- (q-q*)'eq(q,u)  + (p-p*)'gp(p,v).
B(.) gives the net foreign  exchange  required to support  the initial level of utility u when
the vector  of final consumption  taxes is equal to qaq*,  the vector  of output or input  taxes
is equal to -(p-p*),  external  prices are equal to (q*,p*),  and the net external  borrowing  is
equal to P.  The standard  case of international  trade theory is when imported  inputs are
not taxed and when domestic  output is a perfect substitute  for imports. Then consumers
and producers  face the same price vector  p, and an import tariff (p-p*)  is equivalent  to a
tax on consumption  plus a subsidy  on production  at the same  rate. The balance  of
payments  function  may be reduced to:
(1.3')  B(p,u;p*,v,)  =  e(p,u) - g(p,v)-,B
- (p-p*)'(ep(p,u)  - gp(pv)).
The last term on the right hand side of (1.3) is equal to the tariff  revenue, since  Z, the
import  vector,  is equal to ep-gp (negative  for exports).riff  Index  Theory  J.E. Anderson  9
The marginal  dead weight  loss from a chiange  in the tariff vector is equal to minus
change  in the foreign  exchange  required  to support  u, or -Bp'dp. f4ere,  the marginal
t of tariffs  -Bp, may be obtained  from differentiating  (1.3') as:
-B'  =  (p-p*)'(epp  - gpp)  ,  (p,-p*)'Zp.
)taining  (1.4) the envelope  theorem  is used along  with cancellation  of like terms.
nbining (1.4) with the vector  of tariff  changes, the marginal  dead weight  loss from the
ff change  is equal to
-Bp'dp  (p-p*)'(epp - gpp)'dp
(p-p*)'Zpdp  =  (p-p*)'dZ,
dZ is the change in the import  demand vector. See Anderson  and Neary (1991) for
*e  on the properties  of B(.).
erivation  of the  Trade  Restrictiveness  Index
The utility-constant  change  in the foreign  exchange  requirement  (the trade deficit
isured  in terms of foreign  prices)  due to a change in p is equal to Bp'dp. All vectors
vhich  result in equal changes  in Bp'dp  are termed  equivalent  in trade  restrictiveness.
,'dp  is also a compensating  variation  measure  of welfare  change. The trade
rictiveness  index is based  on first noting that the uniform  proportional  change in p
offsets  the change  in B is -Bp'pOdA.  Solving  for the uniform  proportional  change
which is equivalent  in trade restrictiveness  to the arbitrary  change  dp,
dA  =  B(P-)  A.
W  the similarity  of structure  between (1.1')  for the consumer  price index and (1.5) for
ariff  index. Index number  construction  has two steps. The first is to uncover  the
xct  marginal  real income effect (Xi in the case  of the consumer  problem,  Bpi  in the
of the trading  economy). The second step is to find the appropriate  nornalization of
of marginal  changes (q'X in the consumer  problem and Bpp in the trading
omy). The normalization  Bp'p  in (1.5)  is called 'the shadow  value of distorted  trade'Tariff Index  Theory  J.E. Anderson  10
by Anderson  and Neary (1991). It is equal to the net foreign  exchange  required  to
compensate  the representadve  consumer  for a 1% uniform  proportionate  rise in all
distorted  prices.
A more general  definition  is used in index theory to define an index even when
the values of pl are far from the inidal point  p°. ThUS: 3
(1.6)  A(pl,u, 00)  (l  B(plA,uO)  =. 0)
Here, f0 is the initial foreign  exchange  requirement  (trade deficit),  and the constraint
requires A  to change as p changes so as to maintain  a constant trade deficit at the given
u°.  The most intuitive  interpretation  arises  when the new value of p is equal to p*. Then
A is equal to one plus the uniform  ad valorem  tariff rate which is equivalent  in
restrictiveness  to the initial tariff structure. Elsewhere,  A  is equal to the uniform  tariff
factor  surcharge  which  compensates  for (offsets  the change  in trade  restricdtiveness
implied  by) the move  to a new tariff structure. Note that  under definition  (1.6), the
compensadng  change  in foreign  exchange  induced by A is just sufficient  to maintain  u0
when prices shift to pl.  Thus A is a compensating  variation  measure  of the welfare  effect
of the change, and A is interpreted as the uniform  tariff surcharge  which is equivalent  in
welfare  to the change to the new  prices.
The rate of change  of A is obtained  from implicit  differentiation  of (1.6):
dA  X  BPP)  B  A
The structure  of the TRI combines  the standard  welfare  economics  of the marginal dead
weight  loss due to a tax change,  which  is the numerator  of (1.5'), with a normalization
(division)  by Bp'p, the 'shadow  value of distorted  trade'. In contrast to other
normalizations  which  have little or no theoretical  foundation,  scaling  by the shadow  value
of distorted  trade leads to a well-founded  and intuitive  index.
3The  analog  for  theCPI  is:  a(q,u,) = (a l e(qI  u)  = OJ.Tariff Index  Theory  J.E. Anderon  11
Equation (1.5')  is made operetional  using the partial derivatives  Bpj  in (1.4) and
informadon  on substitudon  effects. The elements  of Bp are expected  to be posidve,  but
cross effects  can make some  elements  negadve. This index  can be integrated  to obtain
levels of A, using an inidal level of A  equal to one to tie down the constant  of integration.
Alternatively,  a computable  general  equilibrium  model  c  n solve  A  in (1.6).
A.Tariff Index  Theory  J.E. Anderson  12
1.3  A Diagrammatic  Exposition
The balance  of payments  function  and the trade restrictiveness  index are both
defined above in ternis of the domesdc price vector  p. The instruments  of protection  are
tariffs, however,  and A is interpreted  as a uniform  tariff factor surcharge. To build
intuition  it is helpful  to rewrite the balance  of payments  and trade restrictiveness  index
functions  in terms  of the tariff factor vector  T such that  pi = P*iTi. Based  on this,
(1.7)  BT  =  Bpdiag(p*)  =  (T-l)'diag(p*)Zpdiag(p*),
where  diag(p*)  is a diagonal  matrix with the elements  of the vector  p* on the principal
diagonal,  and I is the vector  of ones. Then:
BT'dT =  Bp'dp.
Figure 1 plots balance  of payments  contours  in tariff factor space (TI,T2)  for a level of
utility u.  The level  of the trade balance  is constant  along the contours,  and if u° is an
equilibrium  utility associated  with a tariff  setting  on the contour,  the balance  of trade
value B must be zero. For a given u, B, the foreign  exchange  requirement  of
consumption, increases  as tariffs rise. The curves are drawn  as convex, and will
ordinarily  but not necessarily  be so.
Suppose  that the initial equilibrium  setting  of tariffs  is at A with equilibrium
udlity u°. The purpose  of any compensating  variation 4 index  number  of tariffs is to
consistendy  map some  alternative  setting  of the tariffs such as point B into a tariff setting
which  supports  the base level of utility  u°.  Consistency  means  that the index should  be
monotonically  related  to efficiency  for all tariff  comparisons.
41t  is  also  possible  to  defne  equivalent  variation  indices.  The  present  development  focusses  on
compensating  variation  measures  since  they  are  more  practicaL  The  equivalent  variation  concept  is
illusted with  a plot  of isoudlity  contours  in  tariff  factor  space.  Set  B  equal  to zero  and  solve  (1.3')  for  the
equilibrium  level  of  utility.  The  isoutility  contours  will  look  like  trade  balance  contours  of  Figure  1,  with
lower  tariff  setings  required  to achieve  higher  levels  of utility.Tariff Index  Theory  J.E. Anderson  13
Figure 1. The Trade Restrictiveness  Index
T2
.450
/ ,  /  ~~~~~~~~B(,ut
Trhe  curve labelled t illustrates  the locus of tariff factors  along which the
imported-weighted  average  tariff remains  constant. Its shape  depends  on the substitution
properties  of the economy,  but it is likely to be downward  sloping. The trade
restrictiveness  index associated  with the move from A to B is equal to OC/OB. The
interpretation  is that the tariff reform  to point B reduces  the foreign  exchange  required to
support u°. The compensating  uniform  rise in tariff factors  is equal to OC/OB. In
contrast,  the mean tariff index  Xt registers  a rise in protection  in the move from A to B,
and is thus an inconsistent  index. In either its level form or its rate of change form,  A is a
tariff index which  consistently  ranks values of T relative  to u. If the transitivityTariff Index  Theory  J.E. Anderson  14
qualification  of compensating  varation measures  is mets, A  ranks values of T relative to
each other.
Now consider  the application  of these concepts  to the evaluation  of a proposed
tariff reform  which  preserves  the trade-weighted  mean tariff, such as point D at the
intersection  of the constant-mean  tariff locus  and the ray OC. Is it possible  that the
coefficient  of variation  of tariff rates will properly  register an increase  in efficiency? The
coefficient  of variation  of tariff factors  is equal to the square  root of the variance  divided
by the mean. Isovariance  contours  are positively  sloped  and increasing  in variance  with
distance  from the 450 line. 6 As drawn,  the move firom  A to D is a move toward the 450
line and is associated  with a reduction  in dispersion,  as mandated  by the World Bank.
However,  point D could lie northeast  rather than southwest  of point C. Thus it appears
that the dispersion  index cannot safely  be used  even when the mean does not shift. The
remainder  of this paper is an attempt  to be more  specific.
5It is well-known  that compensating variation measures need not yield transitive comparisons.  A sufficient
condition for transitivity is homothetic preferences.
6For given weights wi, the parLial  derivative of the variance with respect to tariff rate i is equal to
2wi(r, - I).  The slope of the isovariance contour is equal to -w2(r2  -1)/wl(Cl  - -i). One of the partial
derivatives must be positive and the other negative; hence the slope is positive.Tariff Index  Theory  J.E. Anderson  15
11.  The TRI  and the Standard  Indices
The relation  of the the trade restrictiveness  index to the mean and coefficient  of
variation  of tariffs indices  has two separate  elements. The first is the issue of the proper
weights, and the second is the issue of the proper formula  given the proper weights. In
this section,  the proper marginal  trade weights  are defined,  based on the concept  of the
marginal  cost of tariffs. The trade  restrictiveness  index is then expressed  as a function  of
the mean and 'generalized  variance'  of the tariff schedule  using these weights. Next,  the
trade  restrictiveness  index is used to restate the two  main theorems  on piecemeal  tariff
reform  in terms  of tariff 'moments'. Finally, assuming  the use of the proper weights,  and
also the generalized  variance  concept  in the coefficient  of variation function,  changes  in
the mean or coefficient  of variation  are related  to change in the trade restrictiveness
index.
First, define the usual tariff indices,  the mean,  the variance  and the coefficient  of
variation  of tariffs for some  set of weights (wi)7. The mean ad valorem  tariff is:
(2.  1)  M()  =  wi(Tt-l)  =  1'diag(w)(T-1).
i
The variance  of the tariff schedule  is equal to
(2.2)  V(T)  =  £wi(-MM) 2 =  (T-M(r)lydiag(w)(T-M(T)l).
i
The coefficient  of variation  of the tariff schedule  is
(2.3)  W(T)  =  V(T1/2
Here,  diag(w)  is the diagonal  matrix with wj as the ith diagonal  element,  and 1 is the
vector  of ones. The mean tariff and the coefficient  of variation  of tariffs are usually
measured  with weights  wi equal to the observed  relative trade weights,  wj = pijfYpjZj.
7Normally,  wi>O  and Ewi=l are imposed. The first  restriction  is relaxed  here.Tariff Index  Theory  J.E. Anderson  16
Two tariff vectors  are to be compared  with the various index functions,  the initial
tariff factor vector  being TO  and the new tariff factor vector  being Ti.  The difference  in
tariff factors  equals the difference  in ad valorem  tariffs.
The TRI in Terms of Tariff Moments
The relative  change  form of the trade restrictiveness  index is given by (1.5'). It is
va'id only for local changes.  For discrete  changes,  using the intermediate  value theorem
and evaluating  at T, an intermediate  value of T. (1.5') becomes:
(2.4)  A  =  -£  B  rI)
Here,
(2.5)  T = k  + (1-X)TI for 1Ž>ŽO.
The Divisia  index approximation  to (2.4),  often used as a practical  expedient,  replaces  the
weights  evaluated  at T in (2.4) with the arithmetic  average  of the weights  evaluated  at TI
and at TO:  the Divisia  index. 8
Using (1.4) and (1.7) in (2.4), the numerator  of (2.4)  is equal to
(2.6)  YBTiCD(T 1' - T?)  =  l  £(Ta  - 1)diag(p*)Zjpi(Cdiag(p*)(Ti  - TO)-
The denominator  of (2.42  is equal to:
(2.7)  £BTiMT  =  1  -(Tj - 1)diag(p*)Zjpi(T)diag(p*)T
i J
Next,  divide both the numerator  and the denominator  of A by the double sum of
the elements p*jZjp;p*i. The resulting weights will be termed marginal tMade  weights.
Formally,  the marginal  trade weights  (evaluated  at the intermediate  value T) are defined
as:
(2x8  zij  P*  j  jpip*i
(  "p*jzjpip*i
i  j
The marginal  trade weights  are symmetric  and add to one. Then A  becomes:
8 The  justification  is that  with  a convex  function  A,  the weights  must  be intermediate  between  the endpoint
weights. Convex  A is assumed  here by imposing  convexity  on b(T,u)  in T.Tariff Index Theory  JE. Anderson  17
- (-1),  Izij4(Tl -'I) (2.4')  A  =  - -1  (Zot 
The quadratic  expressions  in the numerator  and denominator  of (2.4') resemble  the
generalized  variance  expressions  which  arise in generalized  least squares. 9 The mean
M(T) is equal to 1'(zij)T  = z.j'T,  which  is the standard  form for a mean with the
'probabilities'  wj being the column  sums  of (z;;).  (Note,  however,  that while l'zj is equal
to 1, not all elements  of zj are necessarily  positive.) The generalized  variance V*(M)  is
equal to (T-M(Tl)z)'(zj)(T-M(T)l).  In the trade restrictiveness  index structure,  the
matrix (zij) is positive  definite  and plays the role of the positive  definite  matrix flQ in
generalized  least squares. The quadratic  expression  in the denominator  of (2.4'),  using
the algebra  of covariance,  is equal  to -(V*(T) + McI)2 - M(T)).  Similarly,  the
numerator  expression  is equal to
- (Cov*(tTI  - TO)  + M(bI)(M(1) - M(TO))) + (M(TI) - M(TO))
=  XV*(TO)  - (1-X)V*C(l)  - (2  - 1)Cov*(Tl,TO)
+  (1 - M(T))(M(TI) - M(TO)).
Here, Cov* stands  for the generalized  covariance. 10 The second  line follows from the
algebra of covariance,  using  equation  (2.5) for T.
Now A may be written  in terms of the 'moments'  of the 'distribution'  of tariffs by
collecting  terms and substituting  back into (2.4'). Thus:
Proposition 1
(2.9)  XV*(T) - (1-x)V*(Tl)  (2X-l)Cov(T 1 ,)
V*(I) - (1 - M(T))MCb  V*(l) - (1 - M(C)McI
+  - (  - M_b  (M(TI)-(  ).
V*()  - (1 -M(l))M(T
9The  standard  linear  regression  model  is Y  = X, + e. If the  variance-covariance  matrix  of e is equal  to n,
where  Q is positive  definite,  then the generalized  least squares  estimator  of  ,  P*, is equal to
(X'f  X)'X'n' Y.  The  matrix  (WX)  is a generalized  variance-covariance  matrix  of X. (X'D'X)' is
the  variance-covaiance  matrix  of the  estimator  P,  and  so  forth.
lOCov*(T0,Tl =  C0-McO)'zijl(T1-M(Tl)).Tariff Index Theory  JE. Anderson  18
The TRI and Piecemeal  EReform  Theorems
Several intuitive  propositions  on tariff reforn can be stated using Proposition  1.
Note from the first term on the right hand side of (2.9) that (i) mean-tariff-preserving
generalized  variance  reducdon  is efficiency  improving  provided the influence  of the
covariance  termn  is small. The influence  of the covariance  term goes to zero (and  X is
equal to 1/2) as tariff changes  are small. Intuitively,  mean-preserving  variance  reducdon
implies  cutting high tariffs and raising  low tariffs. In the case  of generalized  variance,
however,  this implies  cutdng highly  weighted  tariffs and raising  lowly weighted  tariffs.
Formally,  mean-preserving  tariff  reform  is efficient  if
£ (Ti - M(T))zijdTj  <  0,  for each j, and
v  zijdT  =  0.
i&i
Next, (ii) mean tariff  reduction  with constant  variance  is efficiency  improving. Thus the
rule Tl = TO  - a for all tariffs  i is efficient.  That is, a constant ad valorem  rate cut is
efficient. For tariff -eforms  of this type, the mean tariff is a valid index.
The three main piecemeal  tariff  reform  theorems  in the literature  may be stated in
terms  of (2.9):
Uniform  radial  cut dT = -aWT  is efficient  because  it lowers  both the mean
and the generalized  varianceI 1,
Concertina  cut If all goods are net substitutes,  cutting the highest  tariff will
reduce both the generalized  variance  and the mean,  and 12
1This  theorem  is  most  thoroughly  developed  in  Hatta  (1977a,b).
12Under  the  condition  fzi)  has  negative  off-diagonal  and  positive  diagonal  elements.  Moreover,  due  to
the  homogeneity  property  of excess  demand  functions  combined  with  substitutability  of  taxed  with  untaxed
goods,  trzij}>O.  This  means  that  Tjzjj>  - £Tizij If  tariffj  is  ctt,
i*j
(r-MMn)'tz.j)dTj  mmTZiej
The  term  in  brackets  is  positive  if  Tj  is  the  maximal  element  of  the  vector  T,  noting  that  (T-M)/T  is
increasing  in  T.  QED.  This  proposition  is  due  to  Bertand  and  Vanekl(1971).Tariff Index  Theory  J.E. Anderson  19
Dispersion u  dT = - (TO -M(I)1)  is efficient because  it lowers  variance. 13
Thus both the marginal  trade weighted  mean and variance  of the tariff structure  have  the
influence  on efficiency  andcipated  from simple  intuition based  on the trade weighted
mean and variance. For large changes  in tariffs, the influence  of the covariance  in (2.9) is
always zero  if ;  is equal to 1/2. While this is a 'natural'  value, the intermediate  value
theorem  does not guarantee  it for large changes  unless  import  demand is linear.
Notice  that the normalization  term in the denominator  of (2.9) is not simply  the
square  of the mean tariff, as in the (square  of) the coefficient  of variation. The
normalization  of the trade balance  effect  of tariff changes  in (2.9) is in fact the main
contribudon  of Anderson  and Neary. Using it to form the rate of change  of the TRI
yields the proportional  change  in the uniform  tariff factor surcharge  which compensates
for the tariff  changes.
Finally,  what can be said of the coefficient  of variation  index relative  to (2.9)?  If
the mean is preserved  and in additon the schedule  T1 is uniform,  when the coefficient  of
variation  is formed  with the same marginal  trade weights, the difference  in the




Let aUl  indices be based  on marginal  trade  weights. Then  for the mean-preserving
changes  in the schedule  of tariffs which eliminates  variance,  both 3 and the change  in the
coefficient of variation  index conwecdy  sign efficiency changes.
The germ of reasonable  intuition  behind  analysts'  use of the coefficient  of
variatdon  is revealed  in Proposition  1 and its corollary. The marginal  dead weight  loss of
tariff changes  is equal to (p-p*)'Zpdp,  which is essentially  quadratic  in p. Thus
13This  rather  under-appreciated  proposiion  is is  due  to  Fuushima  (1979).Tariff Index  Theory  J.E. Anderson  20
something  like a variance  must be involved  in correctly  signing  the efficiency  change due
to a tariff shift. But even with marginal  trade weights,  the (change  in the) generalized
variance  alone is not a consistent  measure. The trade restrictiveness  index, which  is
consistent,  is not monotonically  related  to the change in the coefficient  of variation  of
tariffs,  even when the latter  uses  generalized  variance  based  on marginal  trade weights.
The change  in the coefficient  of variadon  is equal to
V*(Tl)l/2 V*(TO)1/ 2
(2.10) W(Tl)  - W(TO)  =  M(Tl)  M(TOj  -
The first problem is that  the numerator  of (2.9), which  signs A,  may differ in sign from
V*(TI)  1/2V*(TO)1/ 2, which signs the change  in W under  a mean-preserving  reduction
in variation. Covariation  ofT0 and  T1 matters  to A,  as does the magnitude  of ).
However,  in Section  Im  a Cobb-Douglas  example  is presented  in which  covariation  and
the size of X  do not interfere  with the validity  of inference  from variance  reduction
subject  to a constant  mean.  The second  problem  is that when the mean shifts,  A is
shifted  through  both the numerator  and denominator. In contrast,  it acts through  the
denominator  alone in W. No definite  reladon  can be established  between  A  and the
change  in W given by (2.10).
The problem with the mean shift is worth emphasizing. The coefficient  of
variation  normalizes  the standard  deviation  of a random  variable  by the mean,  which is a
useful  procedure  in descriptive  statistics. In the context  of an index of trade policy,
however,  the proper normalization  of the efficiency  change,  the numerator  of (2.4), is the
'shadow  value of distorted  trade' (see Anderson  and Neary (1991)  for more discussion)
which appears  in the denominator  of (2.4).Tariff Index  Theory  J.E. Anderson  21
llI.The  Cobb-Douglas  Example
Under  Cobb-Douglas  preferences  for imported  final goods, the trade
restrictiveness  index  can be written  as a function  of the trade-weighted  moments  of the
tariff schedule. Mean-preserving  eliminations  of variance  are then efficiency  improving.
The sufficient  condition  can be relaxed  to the CES  case, but it does not appear  possible  to
go beyond this: for example,  strong  separability  is not sufficient. Subsection  11.1 gives
the details. Subsection  111.2  further  develops  the Cobb-Douglas  structure  to show  that all
mean preserving  reductions  in tariff variance  are efficiency  improving.
Import  preferences  which  are Cobb-Douglas  or CES are very restrictive,  of
course,  but perhaps  not quite as restrictive  as they  appear  at first. If the Armington
assumption  is made,  then no inport is a perfect substitute  for a domestically  supplied
good. The reasoning  is that packaging,  advertising,  and safety  design segment all
national  markets. Moreover,  undistorted  nontraded  goods consumer  prices are invariant
to trade taxes if a constant returns  technology  has more traded  goods than nontraded
goods and factors. Then  imports are based on the representative  consumer's  expenditure
function.  A
In contrast,  it is not possible  to extend  the Cobb-Douglas  model  to tax-ridden
exports  and imported  inputs. A Cobb-Douglas  gross  domestic  product  function arises
only under  joint production  of a very special  kind. Moreover,  Lopez  and Panagariya
(1992)  show that for tariffs  on imported  inputs,  complementarity  necessarily  arises
somewhere  in the substitution  effects  structure. Thus the special case is offered  mainly to
illuminate  how restrictive  the circumstances  are which yield the validity  of the World
Bank  dispersion  index. A second  use of this section  is that in offering  a fully worked out
example of the trade  restrictiveness  index, it provides  more intuidon as to the general
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111.1  Marginal Trade Weights and Trade Weights
The relevant  portion  of the trade  expenditure  function is assumed  to be the
consumer's  expenditure  function  e(q,u). With Cobb-Douglas  preferences,  this implies a
demand system:
Ilqaiiu
(3.1)  eqi(q,u)  =  ai-  - eai/qi =  Zi.
qi
Each internal  price qi is equal to the external  price q*j times the tariff factor Ti, possibly
different  from unity.
The marginal  trade weights  are based  on reladve substitudon  effects. The
substitution  effects  system is:
(3.2)  q*jeqiqjq*i  e(-8ij+ aj)ai/TliTj,
where  81j  is the Kronecker  delta. The Zij  weights  are forned by the division of the
elements  of (3.2) by lEq*jeqiqjq*i.
The trade restrctiveness index in rate of change  form is
(3  3)  MS  =BT(T1  _ 1r)  =  ___________________ZijJ A  BfTI -TO)  -(T-1)'(Zij)(T'  -AO
(3.3 A  =B-  T-(T-1)Y(  zjj)T
For discrete  changes,  A  is formed  by substituting  T for T. The simplification  of this
expression  begins by removing  the normalization  of the Zij  weights,  multiplying
numerator  and denominator  by ZZq*jeqiqjq*i.  Now substitute  the elements  of (3.2)
evaluated  at T for zij  on the right hand side of (3.3). The structure  of (3.2) substituted
into (3.3) suggests  defining  tariffs on the domestic  price base:
Xi=  (T1-l)/Ti
T  (TCi-1)/T;
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The numerator  is then  equal to
Z BTi)(TC  - T?)  =  _  e £i  rj(-hj-I  Uj)aii(i  - ;)
e 7jaiiji  (;.  - e (Zaiii  1 -ot
1  I
denominator  of (3.3) is evaluated  at T using (3.2). Note that post-multiplying  by T
els one of the denominator  terms  in (3.2). Thus:
BT'T  e i£aiti  e(ji);axii  =  (1 - oai)aici.
A
Finally,  form a simplified  expression  for A  by substituting  (3.5) and (3.4) into
and dividing  numerator  and denominator  by Zcxq  to form weights  wi = aj/ai.  The
.ights  wi are the domestic  value of (tariff-ridden)  trade share  weights,  qiZiIZq  Zj (based
3.1)). The numerator  term (3.4) becomes
covc,r1;40)  + MC*(l-Zai)(M6& 1) - M(tO))
,w the ratio in (3.3) can be simplified  to yield:
gosition 2
A  ;V(tO)  - (]-A) V(t1) + (2A-1)Cov(,  ?)  _- A  =  (Ia)  - (Wci')  - Mcro)).
( I -zi)  M(r)
For the Cobb-Douglas  case, Proposition  2 shows  that the variance  and  covariance
7ns of the TRI are the usual  trade  weighted  forms.  The term (l-laci)  is equal to one
nus  the tariff-ridden-import  share  of total  expenditure.  Subject  to a given
erpolation  procedure,  the  trade  restrictiveness  index  can  be expressed  in terms  of trade
hted  moments  of the interpolated  tariff  schedule.  The  problem  of properly
erpolating  between  c and l is generically  the same  for  any  discrete  approximation,
t it does  mean  that  the  covariance  may  matter. Thus  the coefficient  of variation  of
iffs  can  be a consistent  index  when  variance  is eliminated  (so  covariance  is zero)  and
mean  tariff  does  not  rise. FormallyTariff Index  Theory  J.E. Anderson  24
Corollarv
Letfinal good importpreferences  be Cobb-Douglas. Then formean-preserving changes
in the schedule  of tariffs which eliminate  variance,  both d and the change  in the trade-
weighted  coefficient of variation  of  aiffs index colTecdy  sign welfare.
For CES expenditure  functions,  the shares,  the a's, are endogenous,  and Zij  is
equal to the elasticity  of substitution  times  expression  (3.2). Since this is a constant
(which moreover  appears  in numerator  and denominator,  hence cancels)  it does not alter
the results. Thus Proposition  2 can be extended  to the CES  case.
The main conclusion  which should  be drawn  from (3.6) is that if the preferences
for imports  really are CES, so that the coefficient  of variation  is valid for mean-
AA 
preserving  eliminations  of tariff variance,  it is also feasible  to calculate  from (3.6)
subject  to the interpolation  error. There was some  intuitive  sense to the earlier procedure,
but the trade  restrictiveness  index makes optimal  use of the moments  of the tariff
schedule. More generally,  using any available  information  on substitution  effects,  it is
A
possible  to measure  A  using the marginal trade  weights  identified  in Section  II. The trade
restrictiveness  index  can then  consistently  measure  all tariff  changes. Moreover,  it has
the interpretadon  of a uniform  tariff surcharge  which compensates  for the tariff change.Tariff Index Theory  J.E. Anderson  25
111.2  Mean-preserving Reductions In Variance
A full development  of the Cobb-Douglas  example  leads to a proposition  in which
variance need  only be reduced,  not eliminated. It also further  illustrates  the properties
of the trade restrictiveness  index and the issues  of Section  II.
Let the representative  consumer's  expenditure  function with two tariff-ridden
goods be
e(T1,T2,u)  =  '-'T'2u
1  2
where al+a2<1, 0k(a;l,2)<l  and the remaining  goods (nontraded  goods and other
imports  and exportables),  are untaxed,  hence have prices equal to unity.
Under  the Armington  assumption,  there is no production  of the tariff-ridden
goods and with no taxation  of exports,  or n :itraded  goods and a constant returns
technology  with more exportables  than  nontraded  goods and factors,  the value of
producdon  is fixed in world prices  at y. This becomes  a parameter  with respect  to the
trade policy analysis.
Under these circumstances,  the balance  of trade function  is
ra1T!2u  T0alT%
(3.7)  B(T,u) =  Tl12Tu  - y - (T1 - l)aI_  T2  (T2 - 1) 1 2
Assuming  no external  borrowing  for simplicity  and setting  B(TO,u 0) equal to zero, the
trade balance  equation  may be solved  for the initial level of utility u°.  The solution
utility level u is related  to T by the distorted  trade  udility  fimction: 14
(3.8) v_  ____T__  __=_  _____  - l_aT7
(3.8)  v(T)  =  1  - Xl  - a2 + al/Tl  + a2/T2" 1  2
The trade restricdveness  index  is implicidy  defined  as
(3.9)  A(T,uO)  =  (A I  B(TA,uO)  = 0).
With u° defined by v(TO)  in (3.8), this implies that  A solves:
14The  distorted  trade  utility  function  is  the  basis  for  an  equivalent  variation  version  of  the  trade
restrictiveness  index.Tariff Index  Theory  J.E. Anderson  26
Tij~  i  Al~i-X
(3.10) 
1t  -_l  a2 F a,/°  10  t°  a(  al - a2) +  al;Tl  + a2/T2
Now consider  the standard  measures,  the mean and variance  of the tariff schedule.
The import-weighted  mean tariff is:
(3.11) M(T)  =  al  T  +  a2T2-i.
a1+ cz2  al  + a2
The import-weighted  variance  of the tariff is:
(3.12) V(T)  =  a+a2(T  - 1)2 +  al  +a(T 2- 1)2 - M(T) 2.
al  + a2  al  + a2
The purpose of this subsection  is to show  that variance  reducing  reforms  which
preserve  the mean tariff are also welfare-improving.  Mean-preserving  tariff changes
imply,  from (3.11),  that
dT2  _  a
dT 1 a2
Under  the constant  mean-tariff constraint,  the variance  changes with a rise in Ti
according  to
(3.13) dV(T) - 2  "  (T  - T2)-
The analysis  is completed  by showing  that dA/dT 1 under  the constraint  has the opposite
sign to (3.13);  i.e., if the variance  decreases,  efficiency  measured  by A  increases.  See the
Appendix  for the technical  details. This means  that
Proposition  3 In the Cobb-Douglas  case,  mean-preserving  local  reductons in the trade-
weighted  varance of tariffs are welfare-improving.
Discrete changes  in the tariff structure  appear  to allow for a possible  reversal of
implications. But if the distorted  trade utility  function is quasi-concave  (the tariff factor
indifference  curve bounds  a convex  set of tariffs preferred  to the initial tariff),  local
superiority  implies superiority  over a range of changes  on the mean tariff line. The
Cobb-Douglas model  has a concave  distorted  trade utility function  for non-negative
tariffs.  Moreover,  for the Cobb-Douglas  model,  for a constant  mean tariff, it is readilyTariff Index Theory  J.E. Anderson  27
shown  that the welfare-maximizing  tariff structure  is a uniform tariff, which  agrees with
the variance-minimizing  solution. This means that each step of variance  reducdon  is
welfare-improving, so that subject  to a constant mean,  the coefficient  of variation  of
tariffs is a legitimate  welfare  index. Figure  2 illustrates.
Figure 2. Tariff Reform  in the Cobb-Douglas  Model
Ti  WMT
wX  ~~~~~~Ti=  T2
u  ~~uO
0  T
The positively  sloped  curves  are coefficient  of variation isoquants,  more variation  implied
by more distance  from the equal tariff  factors  ray. For the Cobb-Douglas model,  the
slope  of the coefficient  of variation  function  is
T-T  VMI)/2
dT1 -2  Tx2  -T
dT2 - VT)/
Ti-T
The  "isovariation"  curves,  labelled  W (for  the  World  Bank)  necessarily  have positive
slope  in  the  two  good  case.  The  local  properties  of  A(T,u)  at  A  show  that  A  rises  as
variance  falls in the inove along the constant  tariff  line  ~I  from  A  to  C.  Both imply a rise
in welfare. The global  properties  of v(T show  that variance  falls all along AE to the
maximal  utility under  the constraint,  so that the variance  measure  is globally  valid under
the constant  mean restriction. In contrast,  when the mean and variance  can both shift,  theTariff Index  Theory  J.E. Anderson  28
diagram  shows that there is a set of tariff reforms  which are welfare-superior,  but which
the coefficient  of variation  would  measure as welfare-inferior. This is depicted as the
cross-hatched  region to the left of point A. When the mean shifts, the intuitive scaling  of
the standard  deviation  by the square  of the mean does not  provide a legitimate  welfare
index.
It would  be nice if more general  preference  structures,  which would  require
different  weights, still  had the property  that variance  reduction  subject to a constant mean
was welfare  increasing. If so, (i) the optimal  tariff would be uniform  and (ii) each
reduction  in marginally  weighted  variance  would  improve  welfare. The results  of Section
II show that (ii) cannot be guaranteed. Regarding  (i), uniforrnity  of the optimal tariff
subject  to a mean constraint  unfortunately  cannot  be guaranteed  for more general
preference  structures. The constant-mean  tariff constraint  is similar  to the revenue
constraint  of public  finance theory,  which shows  that a uniform  tax on the set of goods
available  for taxation  is possible  only under  very strong  assumptions.
IV.  Lessons
Section II lays out the foundation  of the trade restrictiveness  index in relation to
standard  tariff indices.  The trade  restrictiveness  index is linked to the marginal  trade
weighted  mean and the generalized  variance  of the tariff schedule,  which fulfills the
intuition  behind  the World Bank's  use of trade weighted  mean and coefficient  of variation
indices.  Section Im  gives a strong  sufficient  condition  for marginal trade weights  to be
equal to trade weights,  and it does not appear  to be possible  to weaken the substitution
conditions  beyond  the (TS.  For example,  strong  separability  does not suffice. A correct
version  generally  requires the use of marginal  rather than average  trade weights,  but even
so, covariance and "curvature"  also matter outside  the Cobb-Douglas  case.
It is simple to construct  examples  where  welfare moves  in the opposite  direction
from either the mean or the variance  or coefficient  of vaiation, so long as these  move inTariff Index  Theory  J.E. Anderson  29
the opposite  direction. Appendix  2 presents  four such simulations  for the Cobb-Douglas
case. Thus, the trade restrictiveness  index should  be used to replace tariff averages  or
coefficients  of variation,  while  recognizing  the limits  of any such measure  due to having
to identify  or assume a substitution  effects  structure. This problem is met with severe
substitution  structure  assumptions  in Computable  General  Equilibrium  (CGE)  models,
and sensitivity  analysis  on substitution  parameters. A similar procedure  in calculation  of
the trade  restrictiveness  index should  be usable  in principle. Here, a potentially  great
advantage  is that the TRI can feasibly  aggregate  consistently  from the fine structure  of
protection,  a task which  is currently  not possible  with CGE models.
Future work  should  experiment  with various substitution  effects assumptions  and
approximative  vs. numerical  integration,  in order  to see how much difference  the
refinements  make,  and how the trade restrictiveness  index compares  with the standard
indices. A current  World Bank  project is attempting  to implement  the index in a pilot
study of a dozen developing  countries. Early results 15 indicate that (i) the trade
restrictiveness  index often gives  results  opposite to the standard  methods, and (ii) the
trade  restrictiveness  index is not very sensitive  to the substitution  elasticity  values.
15See  Anderson  and  Bannister  (1991)  and  Anderson  (1991).Tariff Index Theory  J.E. Anderson  30
Appendix  1. Proof  of Proposition  3.
Under  the constant  mean-tariff constraint,  the index A changes  with a rise in T1 in
a rather complex  fashion. Fortunately,  the issue of the relation  of tariff variance to A can
be illustrated  by evaluadng  in the neighborhood  of 10, where A  is equal to one. Let
(3.10) be written  as:
Al-al  -42
(3.10') AB  - 0)
B  C(OX)  -
At T equal to TO,  A  is equal to one, B is equal to C, and A is equal to one.  Differentiating
(3.10')  under the constant-mean-tariff  constmint,
A  lQal  1  2
O  - al  MD-a  dA. -Xal  - c  c
Using the local properties  at T equal to TO,  this implies:
dIA  I_I  I  I  1
(3.14)  T  _a  (T  -T)CT-  )
O - i  - T2i-C  2-
At T equal to  T0, C is equal to 1  - a  T1  -1a2 T2  - which is less than one for non-
negative tariffs. Thus the first ratio is negative. The large bracketed  term factors  into
IT  I2  ;F1 T2  1-  al  Txi*+a 2 O
T111  T(-1
(*-  i)((l~1VT  +  T2
(;F1 -;(-F2)  - 1
where the right bracket  is negative. Then:
sign dA/dTl = sign (T-  jT)for  non-negative  tariffs.Tariff Index  Theory  J.E. Anderson  31
ARpendix 2. CobbtDouglas  Simulations
This appendix  presents  the results of the simulation  of the Cobb-Douglas  model.
The two tariff case is chosen with a tariff iniially equal to .5 for good 2 with 10%  of
expenditure  on it and .2 for good 1 with 5% of expenditure  on it. The initial trade-
weighted  mean tariff  is equal to 40%. In the Cobb-Douglas  model, so long as the mean
and variance  of tariffs move in the same  direction,  the TRI must also move in that
direction. The interest is in the cases where  this does not hold. The simulations  show
four  cases of tariff  changes  for which the mean  and variance  (and coefficient  of variation)
move in opposite  directions. The first two rows show  the relative  tariff changes (from  the
initial base of  `z  = .2 and r2 = .5). The  next four rows of the table illustrate  that any
possible  combination  of TRI change  with mean  and offsetting  variance  or coefficient  of
variation  change  may be found. For tariff changes  of the type used here, the mean or
variance  (or coefficient  of variation)  index would  be wrong half the dme.
cases  I  II  III  IV
relative  tariff 1  1.458333333  1.125  0.91666667  1.18333333
relative  tariff 2  0.8  0.96666667  0.96666667  0.93333333
relative  mean  tariff  0.958333333  1.04166667  0.83333333  1.01666667
relative  variance  1.007631258 0.11111111  1.36111111 0.00444444
relcoeffvar  1.047452219  0.32  1.4  0.06557377
TRI  0.99192921  0.99836569  1.04294631  1.00648972Tariff Index Theory  J.E. Anderson  32
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